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Abstract. In this paper, we assess the protection mechanisms entered
into recent clients to fight against the Sybil attack in KAD, a widely
deployed Distributed Hash Table. We study three main mechanisms:
a protection against flooding through packet tracking, an IP address
limitation and a verification of identities. We evaluate their efficiency by
designing and adapting an attack for several KAD clients with different
levels of protection. Our results show that the new security rules mitigate
the Sybil attacks previously launched. However, we prove that it is still
possible to control a small part of the network despite the new inserted
defenses with a distributed eclipse attack and limited resources.
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1 Motivation and scope of work
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks have proven their ability to host and share a large
amount of resources thanks to the collaboration of many individual peers. They
are known to have many advantages compared to the client-server scheme: P2P
networks scale better; the cost of the infrastructure is distributed and they are
fault tolerant. Most currently deployed structured P2P networks are based on
Distributed Hash Tables (DHT). Each peer is responsible for a subset of the
network. This organization improves the efficiency of P2P networks ensuring
routing in O(log n) but can also lead to security issues like the Sybil Attack.
The Sybil Attack, as described by Douceur [3], consists in creating a large
number of fake peers called the ”Sybils” and placing them in a strategic way in
the DHT to take control over a part of it. Douceur proved that the Sybil Attack
cannot be totally avoided as long as the malicious entity has enough resources to
create the Sybils. This problem was not considered when designing most of the
major structured P2P networks. In this context, the goal of the defense strategies
described in the literature is to limit the Sybil Attack as completely stopping
it is impossible. Proposed solutions are based on a strong identification of the
peer [2] or on a trusted central authority [1]. In [8], the authors propose to bound
the degree of overlay nodes by anonymous auditing to limit localised attacks but
they also rely on a central certification to limit the number of Sybils. A strong
identification being not adapted to many P2P applications, other strategies are
possible to limit the Sybil attack considering that a distributed assignment with
free identifiers is possible but, in compensation, must be verified by resource
consuming proofs [7] or an underlying social network [10]. The most successfully
completed protection against the Sybil attack [4] uses distributed certification
coupled with a social network, but no studies consider practical protections set
in a real network.
Even if defense against the Sybil attack has been largely investigated, most
of the proposed solutions are difficult to set up and are not always well suited for
the P2P paradigm. Things are even worse when considering all the constraints
of a large public P2P network like KAD without a managed support infrastruc-
ture and with the need of backward compatibility. KAD provides a file sharing
application based on the academic Kademlia [5] DHT and has been proven vul-
nerable and totally unprotected against Sybil attacks that can highly affect the
network [9]. In this context, managing and protecting the KAD network seems
very challenging.
The latest versions of the major KAD clients have introduced new protec-
tion mechanisms to limit the Sybil attack, making the previous experiments
concerning the security issues of KAD like [9] inefficient. These newly imple-
mented protection mechanisms have neither been described nor been evaluated
and assessed. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the implemented security
mechanisms against real attacks. We will then be able to have an updated view
of KAD vulnerabilities: Is the network still vulnerable to the attack proposed
in [9]? Is it now fully protected? Which vulnerabilties have been corrected and
which ones keep being a threat? This work is a first and necessary step to design
improved defense mechanisms in future works. As far as we know, this paper is
also the first attempt to experiment and assess practical protections set by the
P2P community to protect a real network.
This document is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the background
of KAD, the Sybil attacks performed on it, and the new defense mechanisms.
We then present in Section 3 our evaluation of the mechanisms including our
methodology, the results obtained by the different versions of KAD clients and
the impact of our distributed eclipse attack. Finally, Section 4 concludes the
paper with a discussion on the validity of the built-in protections and outlines
our future works.
2 KAD and the Sybil attack
2.1 Overview of KAD
KAD is a structured P2P network based on the Kademlia distributed hash ta-
ble routing protocol [5]. KAD is implemented by the popular eMule file sharing
application and its multi-platform version aMule, both are open source. Histori-
cally, these clients were mainly designed to join the eDonkey network composed
of autonomous distributed servers. However, many major eDonkey servers have
been closed by lawsuits so that the eDonkey network is becoming less attrac-
tive and users are progressively migrating toward the fully decentralized P2P
network, KAD. With an estimated number of concurrent online users around 4
millions, KAD is the widest deployed structured P2P network.
Each node of KAD has a 128bits KADID defining its position in the DHT.
Two types of requests are used to discover the network: the Hello REQ is used
by a peer to announce itself and the Kademlia REQ is used to discover new peers
toward a specific address. The routing is based on the XOR metric: to fill the
routing table, each node registers at level i K-contacts (called a K-bucket), each
contact being at a distance between 2128−i and 2127−i from its KADID regarding
the XOR metric. The deeper the contact is in the tree, the closer it is to the
node and the better the peer knows this part of the DHT; this provides routing
in O(log n). The routing is done in an iterative way with parallel lookups: asking
at first the n closest contacts to the target ID found in the routing table for even
closer nodes toward the target with Kademlia REQ, waiting for their responses
and then reiterating.
As a file sharing application, the purpose of the DHT is to retrieve infor-
mation like keywords and files. When sharing a new file, the binary and all the
keywords are hashed separately with a MD5 function generating KADIDs and
then published. The peers in charge of a file or a keyword are those close enough
to their hash. This distance is called the tolerance zone and is set to the first
common 8bits (most significant bits). The double indexation allows retrieval of
a particular file, given a set of keywords. To publish a file, two types of requests
are sent:
– KADEMLIA2 PUBLISH KEY REQ requests are sent to the hash of the
keyword and associate a keyword with a file
– KADEMLIA2 PUBLISH SOURCE REQ requests are sent to the hash of
the file and associate a file to a source (a node able to upload the file)
2.2 Previous attacks in KAD
Recent investigations showed that KAD can be cheated in several ways using
few resources and resulting in important outages.
Steiner et al [9] were the first to successfully launch a real Sybil attack on
KAD, resulting in the full control of a part of the network. The attack is divided
in two steps. The first step consists in a crawler gathering information about
what peer is in a zone of the network and what its routing table is. This is
done by issuing route requests (Kademlia REQ) toward some predefined node
IDs in order to obtain new contacts close to those IDs. When almost all nodes
of the zone are known by the crawler, the second step consists in individually
contacting each node of the list to pollute its routing table with Sybils. Previously
trivial, injection of Sybils is now protected by several mechanisms studied in the
forthcoming sections.
In [6], the authors describe an attack that allows denial of service on a great
part of the network with few resources. This attack does not rely on a classical
injection of Sybils but hijacks the references of contacts in the routing table. Ma-
licious nodes are able to overwrite a legitimate routing table entry (KADID/IP
address) with their own reference by sending a simple Hello REQ announcing
this KADID. This weakness highlights a real lack of identity management in
KAD. Thanks to the information acquired by a crawler, this vulnerability allows
to partition the network or to do a massive denial of service. A search request
starts from bad references and is then kept by them, until it terminates without
any real result, or fails because of a timeout. The experiments on PlanetLab
show that the attack is effective and does not use much bandwidth with some
optimizations. The authors also noticed the improvements of the latest versions
of the clients which could mitigate their attack, but they did not evaluate them.
2.3 Protections in KAD
The importance of these weaknesses forced the developers to react by setting
up new protections in the latest versions of the clients. Even if older clients are
still vulnerable, progressive updates should be able to mitigate the attacks and
constitute a healthy basis for the network. KAD clients implement different levels
of protection regarding their version. For similar versions, eMule and aMule are
based on the same code and behave in the same way. Table 1 sums up the
protections implemented in each of the clients.
Clients Flood protection IP limitation IP verification
eMule 0.48a / aMule 2.1.3 No No No
eMule 0.49a / aMule 2.2.1 Yes Yes No
eMule 0.49b / aMule 2.2.2 Yes Yes Yes
Table 1. Protection enabled according to the client version
No protection: aMule 2.1.3 was chosen as a client without any protection
against the Sybil attack. Basically, aMule accepts all incoming messages without
any check: requests can be sent as fast as the client can handle them. There is no
restriction regarding the KADID or the IP address of the sender. As long as the
sender of a request matches a place left in a K-bucket, it can be added. With the
KADID of the target and a good knowledge of the routing table mechanisms, it
is possible to quickly take control of a legitimate peer.
Packet tracking and flood protection: The packet tracking function records
the history of recently received and sent packets (12 minutes). This history is
used for two purposes. The first goal is to be able to detect and drop unsolicited
request answers. The second purpose is to set up a protection against flooding.
With the history and time of previously received packets, it is possible to detect
if an IP address is a source of flooding. For each type of KAD request, a threshold
is defined per peer under which the number of received requests is considered
legitimate. If the threshold is not highly exceeded, the packets over the limit are
simply dropped. If the rate of received requests is more than five times above
the limit, the sender is considered as an attacker and his IP address is banned
from the client.
IP address limitation: The IP address limitation tries to mitigate the Sybil
attack, considering that public IP addresses are more or less restricted per par-
ticipant. Before adding a new peer in the routing table, its IP address is checked
and dropped if it is already used. This verification limits to one the number of
KADID per IP address in the routing table. This really helps protecting a client
against a Sybil attack which needs a lot of public IP addresses to be significant.
The IP address limitation also takes care of IP addresses from the same /24
subnetwork or smaller. In fact, at most ten IP addresses from the same /24 sub-
network can be added to the routing table to prevent a single entity with many
resources to be able to launch an attack. These ten peers are also constrained to
be in different K-buckets of the routing table, or in other words to have spaced
KADIDs. This is done to prevent the entity owning a /24 subnet to launch a
localized attack which needs to have Sybils very close to the target ID. This pro-
tection does not affect NATed users which can fully participate to the network
with the very unlikely constraint that two NATed peers with the same public IP
address can not be referenced in the same routing table of another contact.
Identities verification: The last KAD clients implement even more protections
concerning identity management. They aim to limit the identity spoofing (both
IP address and KADID) between peers. Before adding a contact, KAD now uses
a three-way handshake for new contacts, making sure they do not use a spoofed
IP. Older version are verified with a similar check as presented in table 2. Oldest
clients are checked with a second Hello REQ - Hello RES exchange including
a random KADID as a challenge for the responding peer. Newer clients use an
exchange of PING and PONG messages which add cryptographic identification.
Finally, the last versions do the three-way handshake in the most effective way
with the specially added new message Hello RES ACK.
Clients Sequence Nb of messages Encryption
eMule 0.48a Hello REQ - Hello RES - 4 No
Hello REQ(challenge) - Hello RES(challenge)
eMule 0.49a Hello REQ - Hello RES - PING - PONG 4 Yes
eMule 0.49b Hello REQ - Hello RES - Hello RES ACK 3 Yes
Table 2. Three-way handshake is achieved differently regarding the client version
Moreover, KAD contacts are only able to update themselves in other’s routing
tables if they provide the proper private key corresponding to the public key
initially presented (supported by 0.49a+ nodes), in order to make it impossible
to hijack them. Finally, contacts which fail the challenge are marked unverified
and are not used for routing tasks. Theses protections avoid attacks using IP-
spoofing and contact overwriting. It is a response to the routing attack issues
described in [6] and one of the solutions proposed by the authors.
3 Evaluation of the protection mechanisms
In this section we evaluate different KAD clients and the mechanisms described
above when facing a Sybil attack.
3.1 Methodology
As the injection of Sybils is the basis for attacking the network, we measure
how permeable the routing table of a single peer is regarding the different levels
of protection, and how restricted in their possibilities are the Sybils when they
pass the protections. To evaluate the behavior of the defense mechanisms, we
developed a basic attack software with the initial objective of polluting the
routing table of a single peer running an unprotected version of KAD client.
We then incrementally added the protection mechanisms by evaluating newer
versions of the client and modified our attack accordingly.
For some of our experiments, our Sybil attack does not target the entire
network as the one in [9] but only aims a single client. In fact, the protection
mechanisms that we want to study are local to the client and do not require any
interaction between peers. In consequence, the results obtained when evaluating
a single client are sufficient and can be easily generalized as a good indicator of
what the network will be in the future when most of them will be up to date.
Our attack announces Sybils by sending many Hello REQ with forged KA-
DIDs. The main difficulty of this attack is to announce the right identity for each
Sybils to match the algorithm filling the routing table of the target and as con-
sequence, maximize the pollution. Designing the generation of Sybil identities
requires knowledge of the structure and algorithms of KAD routing table.
Looking at the code of KAD, the real structure of its routing table is slightly
different from the proper binary tree defined in Kademlia [5]. First of all, all leafs
can be split until level 4 without restriction, resulting in 16 K-Buckets covering
the entire address space and used to route the farthest destinations. Then, at
the level 4, the closest K-buckets with an index below 4 (which means that
considering the 4 first bits: KADID XOR ContactID <= 4) can keep splitting
until having an index of 8 or 9 by involving further bits as shown in figures 1.
The depth of the routing table is not hardly limited but is limited de facto by the
size of the network because fewer contacts are possible for deep buckets whose
split becomes unlikely.
With this knowledge of the routing table and a targeted KADID, preparing
the attack consists in generating a set of proper masks so that: targetID XOR
Fig. 1. KAD routing table scheme
mask = SybilID. The value of the masks are defined to generate SybilIDs pro-
gressively filling all the routing table of the targeted peer from the top to the
bottom, by hitting the right K-bucket.
As we inject specifically forged contacts, they can hit deeper K-buckets in
the routing table so that the size of the table under attack is higher than the
size during a normal run. From the target point of view, the announcement of
very close Sybils is considered as if the DHT space was more populated and
consequently closer contacts easily findable.
3.2 Results
No protection: The first client attacked was aMule 2.1.3. This version is unpro-
tected resulting to the realization of the simplest and most effective Sybil attack
possible. Sybils KADIDs are forged as described previously and announced with
a rate of 4 per second which is sufficient to populate the K-buckets faster that
the normal algorithm without overloading the target client.
Actually, KAD contacts are periodically checked by sending an Hello REQ
and waiting for the Hello RES to keep the routing table up to date. But this
version also presents a kind of optimization that becomes a major design flaw
when considering the Sybil attack. In fact, every Hello RES from an IP address
(whatever its KADID is) acknowledges every contact with this IP address. As
all Sybils share the same IP address, a single Hello RES aknowledges this IP
address and is sufficient to keep hundreds of Sybils alive. Moreover, a peer can
announce itself with a Hello RES instead of a Hello REQ, and still be added
to the table. Following this discovery, our attack sends Hello RES so that each
new Sybil acknowledges and maintains the previous ones in the routing table
without any message exchange.
Fig. 2. Propagation of Sybils in the
routing table
Fig. 3. Filling of the routing table un-
der attack
The first results show that the routing table of the unprotected version is al-
most fully corrupted under attack (graph 2): at the end of an attack lasting 300s,
the routing table of aMule counts 70% of Sybils (689 Sybils for 953 contacts).
The major part of the routing table which is not polluted is made up of 200 good
contacts saved from the previous execution and pre-loaded to bootstrap. Graph
3 shows at which speed the routing table of aMule is filled regarding if attacked
or not. Even if the speed of Hello RES sent by the Sybils was moderate, we
can clearly see the Sybil attack as the routing table abnormally grows under
the announcements of Sybils. Theses results confirm the need for the following
protection mechanisms.
Flooding protection: The second experiment aims to evaluate the flood pro-
tection. So, we launched an attack against the eMule 0.49a client with the IP
limitation disabled. To be successful, the attack had to be improved in two
ways. First, the packet tracking used to implement the flood protection drops
Hello RES without previous Hello REQ so that the weakness described above
to maintain Sybils is not possible anymore. Therefore, we modified our attack to
keep each Sybil alive by responding to the Hello REQ messages from the victim.
The problem is that Hello REQ messages do not include the targeted KADID
whereas Hello RES messages need it. A normal peer just has to manage its own
KADID so that it clearly knows what to respond to a Hello REQ message. On
the contrary, our Sybil attack manages multiple identities and does not know
which KADID is addressed by the Hello REQ message. To bypass this limitation
and find with which KADID to answer, each Sybil communicates on a differ-
ent UDP port so that we can retrieve the wanted KADID. With this modified
attack, we are able to maintain Sybils alive in the long run. Secondly, we sent
Hello REQ messages every 30 seconds to be under the threshold.
Our experiments show that the flooding protection works as expected. The
limitation rate before dropping Hello REQ is set to 3 packets per minute and
above 15 packets per minute, our IP address is banned. The results are shown
in graph 4. We can see that even if the attack is clearly slowed down, taking
more than 8 hours to inject the same number of Sybils where previous attack only
took few minutes, the routing table is still polluted with more than 60% of Sybils
(540/873). The flooding limitation can protect the majority of short connections
to the KAD network, but longer connections still suffer from a widely infected
routing table.
Fig. 4. Propagation of Sybils in the
routing table with flood protection en-
abled
Fig. 5. Propagation of Sybils with
spoofed IP addresses with flood & IP
limitation protections enabled
Adding IP limitation: Our previous attacks were performed from a computer
using a single IP address. With IP limitation enabled, we effectively measure that
only the first Sybil enters the routing table, the other KADIDs presenting the
same IP address can not pass. To bypass this limitation, we modified our attack
using raw sockets so that each Sybil is announced with its own randomly spoofed
IP address. The graph 5 shows that Sybils with spoofed IP addresses totally
break this protection. The first time we launched the attack to evaluate the IP
limitation, we disabled the flooding protection. When activating both of them in
a second time, we noticed that the flooding protection is also completely bypassed
by the IP spoofing. In fact, the packet tracking used to detect flooding measures
the number of incoming requests from a given IP address. When spoofing IP
addresses, each message appears to be from a different source so that the flooding
is not detected. Even if IP spoofing can not be used to spy or eclipse content in
the network, spoofed IP addresses were used in [6] with contact overwriting to
partition the KAD network. This attack remains possible at this point, but the
very last version of the clients implements a protection to mitigate both IP and
KADID spoofing.
Adding identity verification: The attack launched to test the identity ver-
ification mechanisms is the same as the one described above, using Sybils with
Fig. 6. Evolution of the contacts status
in a normal run
Fig. 7. Evolution of the contacts status
under Sybil attack
spoofed IP addresses. Part of the behavior of this last mechanism seems strange
and disappointing because the Sybils that fail the three-way handshake are still
added (at least temporary) to the routing table and marked as ”unverified”. The
rate of unverified contacts is high even without attack during the first 15 min-
utes of connection (graph 6). Even if unverified contacts are not used for routing
tasks, they can take the place of potentially good contacts in a K-bucket, result-
ing in a reduction of the routing efficiency for the peer. The positive aspects are
that all Sybils are marked as unverified (graph 7) and that unverified contacts
are dropped faster from the routing table than with the classical 1-hour timeout.
Moreover, unverified contacts can not update themselves before being checked,
so that Sybils with spoofed IP addresses really are active for only a limited
time. As expected, we also experimented that KADID overwriting is from now
on impossible without the proper private key and mitigates the attack described
in [6].
The results obtained with the very last version show significant improve-
ments of the Sybil attack defense. As expected, IP address limitation coupled
with identity verification avoids the Sybil attack from a single source when it
previously would have been able to infect and spy or DoS the whole network.
3.3 Distributed eclipse attack
At this point, we have tested the resilience of the routing table to Sybils with
the new protection mechanisms. But a massive Sybil attack is not the only and
smartest way to damage the network. More localized Sybil attacks are possible
and need fewer resources. The eclipse attack is another well-known issue of the
KAD network as described in [9]. It consists in placing few malicious peers very
close to the target ID in the DHT and making them known. Prior to the attack,
the authors used a ”crawler” in a tolerance zone to know many contacts and
promote their Sybils. As all requests toward the target will pass through this
zone where the peers are polluted, and considering the KAD search algorithm
”return the X closest nodes...”, the requests will arrive at malicious nodes with
a high probability.
More than the massive injection of Sybils, we think that the heart of the
eclipse attack is the possibility to freely chose its KADID very close to a target
which keeps being possible. As this issue is not yet handled in the last versions of
KAD, the eclipse attack remains a threat even if the IP limitation now requires
its distribution (involving several public IP addresses). We did a distributed
eclipse attack with 24 nodes from PlanetLab and EmanicsLab1. Our client is
based on aMule 2.2.2, compiled to run as a daemon and modified in several
points to make the attack. Our client uses a forged KADID to be very close (96
bits) to the hash of a given keyword. For this specific ID, our client spies the
incoming requests and eclipses the keyword by answering to Publication requests
and denying Search requests. To improve its efficiency, our client announces itself
actively by periodically sending Kademlia routing and Hello requests toward pre-
defined KADIDs in order to be known in the network and attract requests, as
an alternative to a centralized crawler.
We first launched our attack on the keyword ”the”, known to be the most
indexed keyword in the network. Despite a massive indexation of publish requests
by our Sybils (16000 requests per minute), we cannot totally eclipse the keyword.
So, we analysed the results obtained by a search request on ”the” and we found
out that all the answers came from the same IP address managing 256 KADIDs
sharing 120bits with the keyword, but not denying any Search request. In other
words, ”the” was already the target of another classical Sybil attack, always
possible as a large part of the network is not yet updated with the new clients.
In a second time, we launched our attack on the keyword ”document”, receiving
”only” 115 publish requests per minute but resulting in its total eclipse. Even if
the needed bandwidth depends on the size of the attack and the popularity of
the targeted ID, it keeps very small (few KB/s by node).
In conclusion, distributed and localized attacks do not require substantial
resources and keep being a real threat despite the new mechanisms as long as
the KADID can be freely chosen and the malicious nodes placed very close to a
given target. Controlling a small botnet, or more generally some IP addresses dis-
tributed over multiple subnets, allows a malicious user to control several entries
of KAD.
4 Conclusion
Considering the previous attacks and our evaluation of an old client, KAD was
totally unprotected and very easily and badly hurt by a Sybil attack from a single
computer. The local solution chosen by the authors of eMule fits the constraints
of the network: no infrastructure cost and backward compatibility. The network
is progressively being composed of new clients including the protections and
becomming more robust. We have shown that the new defensive rules really
1 EmanicsLab is an autonomous testbed network based on PlanetLab architecture and
sponsored by the European Network of Excellence EMANICS
make the Sybil attack harder to perform and successfuly mitigate the previously
experimented attacks at a low cost. Where an attack could have been launched
from a single computer few months ago [9], similar results can only be achieved
now with a botnet or a more complex distributed architecture.
Even if these security mechanisms are a step forward, they are not yet suf-
ficient. We have shown that a distributed eclipse attack focused on a particular
ID still remains possible with a moderate cost. This result shows that the main
weakness of KAD has shifted to the possibility to reference many KADIDs with
the same IP address to the left possibility to freely choose its KADID. More-
over, if we consider an attacker with many resources, particularly considering
the number of IP addresses, the overall protection can be threatened due to the
specific design using local rules. As all protections are local to the client, a same
pool of IP addresses can potentially infect all peers. Considering this, an attacker
with several hundreds of spaced IP addresses can massively infect the network
(for example, if controlling a medium-sized Botnet) and realize large attacks on
the network scale. Thus, the IP limitation as currently defined, seems to be a
very short-lived protection mechanism when considering IPv6. A single personal
broadband connection could be assigned with a /64 or even more, which is suffi-
cient to launch massive Sybil attacks with one different public IPv6 address per
Sybil. The rules concerning the IP address limitation will have to be adapted
carefully in order not to become inefficient.
However, even if not perfect, the defenses against the Sybil attack studied in
this paper are absolutely generic and can be easily applied to every structured
P2P network. We think that this kind of ”common-sense” protection based on
self-management is the minimum that every implementation of a structured P2P
network should have, unless being totally unaware of the Sybil attack issues. In
our future work, we will design and evaluate new security mechanisms to mitigate
the distributed eclipse attack. It is interesting to consider the impact of this
attack on the routing table of KAD and on the indexing and search processes.
Being given the existing security rules of the indexing scheme, evaluating the
remaining weaknesses will lead us to design new constraints improving the local
protection.
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